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 2 
Sammanfattning 
 
Proaktiv interferens inträffar när inlärd information interfererar med pågående inlärning. 
Följande studie ämnade undersöka huruvida gamla minnen kan interferera med ny 
information vid återkallning, bara genom att återinföra kontexten där den gamla 
informationen lärdes in. Försökspersonerna fick genomföra två jorden-runt-resor som visades 
på en tv-skärm, och testades sedan genom Brown-Petersons minnesuppgift. En resa bestod av 
nio destinationer (ex. Japan) och minnesuppgiften var att komma ihåg tre triader av ord från 
samma semantiska kategori vid varje resmål. Efter de första sex destinationerna presenterades 
en fjärde triad av ord från samma semantiska kategori i antingen ett nytt resmål, eller i samma 
resmål som förut. Hypotesen är att tidigare inlärda ord ska interferera med inlärningen av de 
nya orden om denna sker på samma destination som förut. Trettiotre försökspersoner (23 
kvinnor, 10 män) deltog i experimentet (M = 23,93 år, 20-29 år). Resultaten visade på en 
försämring av minnesprestationen från försök ett till tre. Den proaktiva interferensen försvann 
vid försök fyra. Emellertid fanns det ingen signifikant skillnad i försök fyra mellan att 
återinföra den gamla kontexten, eller att inte göra det.  
 
Nyckelord: proaktiv interferens, minne, kontext, event-modell, event-segmentering 
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Abstract 
 
 
Proactive interference occurs when previously learned information interfere with current 
processing. The research presented here examined how old memories can compete with new 
information during recall by reinstating the context from which the material was learned. 
Participants were exposed to two around the world trips on a television screen and were 
tested on memory using the Brown-Peterson task. A trip consisted of nine locations (e.g. 
Japan) and the memory task was to memorize three triads of words from the same semantic 
category at each location. After the first six destinations a fourth triad of words from that 
same word category was presented at the same destination as before, or at a new destination. 
Previously learned words were then expected to interfere with the words currently being 
memorized if the participant visited the same locations. Thirty-three subjects (23 female, 10 
male) voluntarily participated in the experiment (M = 23,93 years, range = 20 – 29 years). 
The results showed a declined memory performance from trial one to three. There was also a 
release from proactive interference in trial four. However, there was no significant difference 
between memory performance in trial four whether the old context was reinstated or not. 
 
 
Key words: proactive interference, memory, context, event model, event segmentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 4 
      Introduction 
  Have you ever experienced that when you want to learn new material the old material 
limits and interfere with your learning? You are not alone! Interference is a big source of 
error in short-term memory (Craig, Berman, Jonides, & Lustig, 2013). Knowledge that is in 
centre of attention, i.e. “to-be-remembered” information, will have the highest activation in 
short-term memory, while other information, i.e., previously learned material, will be 
peripheral. This information can easily be moved in to attention and thus interfere with the 
information currently being processed (McElree, 2001; Radvansky, 2012).  
  Important studies in the field of interference were developed from the middle of the 
20th century (Craik, 1971; Underwood, 1957; Watkins & Watkins, 1975; Wickens, 1970; 
Wickens, Dalezman, & Eggemeier, 1976a, 1976b). Wickens and his colleagues’ (1976) 
experiment consisted of a number of tests on word triads from semantic categories, a task 
developed by John Brown, Lloyd Peterson and Margaret Peterson (Brown, 1958; Peterson & 
Peterson, 1959). Participants were told to remember one triad of words. The triads were 
shown for two seconds. After a distracter task, which consisted of 18 seconds of counting 
backwards by threes from a given number, the words were to be retrieved and verbally told. 
The participants’ memory for words from the same semantic category decreased for each 
triad of words they were told to remember (build-up of proactive interference, PI). But, by 
merely changing the category (e.g., from fruits to flowers) after three triads of words, the 
memory for the words in the new category was nearly as good as the first triad of words in 
the old category (release from proactive interference, rPI). This was an ingenious way of 
showing how working memory can be overloaded with information due to category specific 
impairments and semantic organisation. 
  It is well known that context has a strong influence on memory. For instance 
participants who learned lists of words under water were better at recalling those words under 
water then in an alternative context. Likewise if the participants learned the lists of words on 
land they were better at recalling them in the same environment (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). 
Up until today innumerable studies have been carried out to explain the underlying 
mechanisms of memory retrieval. The context maintenance and retrieval model (CMR) helps 
us get a greater understanding of the dynamics of memory search (Polyn, Norman, & Kahana, 
2009). This model explains how memory clusters information through different organization 
schemes, more specific via semantic-, temporal- and source factors. Memory will cluster 
events that happened in the same environment, and if a sudden context change occurs 
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memory can isolate events within one context (Polyn et al., 2009).  
  Everyday life contains of a constant dynamic flow of observed information. People 
make sense of this in part by segmenting the stream of information into events. In turn, these 
events work as meaningful units that help us encode-, retrieve- and communicate information 
to ourselves, and others. Events guide us while we are making our actions and give us a clue 
of what is about to happen (Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & 
Reynolds, 2007). 
  According to Zacks & Tversky (2001) an event is a segment of time, which has to be 
experienced at a given location and have to have a beginning or an end. People are able to 
distinguish events from each other by determining when an event ends and another one 
begins. This inherent ability is referred to as an “event structure perception” that makes it 
possible for us to instinctively segment flowing activity into events. People have active 
representations of the present event that are updated due to changes in its features. These 
representations are called event models. Events consequently helps us make anticipations 
about future information, which is an assumption that is the basis for event segmentation 
theory, EST (Kurby & Zacks, 2008). When an event ends, its information becomes stored in 
memory, so that information in the following event does not occupy space in the past event 
model (DuBrow & Davachi, 2013). 
  Event segmentation occurs in the change of the features of the activity observed. The 
changes can for example be physical or conceptual; the activity of going home after a day at 
work could be divided into several different events due to location (being at home or at work) 
or conceptuality (talking to a co-worker about your family). These chunks of events give 
necessary and functional hints about what have been done and how different activities are 
related to each other (Kurby & Zacks, 2008). The point where one event ends and another one 
begins is called event boundary. Event boundaries are crucial as they make people update 
their current memory representations to an alert adjustment of what is going on in the 
moment and what could happen in the future. Imagine walking to the kitchen to get a cup of 
coffee. When the phone suddenly rings predictions of the event become invalid as a lot of 
errors occur. Prediction errors induce a need for updating memory and generate a new 
hypothesis of “what to do next” (Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Radvansky, Tamplin, & Krawietz, 
2010). Thus, event boundaries make people update their memory so that new information can 
be encoded. 
  There are however different results from studies on how event boundaries affect 
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memory; when a context shift occurs in a narrative, reading time increases (Zwaan, Langston, 
& Graesser, 1995); lists of words become harder to memorize due to context shifts in the 
surrounding architecture (Radvansky et al., 2010); when an object is presented on the event 
boundary memory for those objects increases (Swallow, Zacks, & Abrams, 2009). And it is 
not a simple one-way procedure for how people segment events. We comprehend situations, 
environments and behaviour differently partially by how we perceive event boundaries 
(Swallow et al., 2009). Simple instructions of how to segment events can affect how people 
perceive and apprehend time and activity. In a study by Newtson (1973) people were 
presented with different instructions before watching an actor perform everyday activities 
(short films). The observers were divided into two groups: one group got instructions telling 
them to meaningfully segment the actor’s behaviour into as small units as possible, while the 
other group got instructions about meaningfully segmenting the behaviour into as big units as 
possible. The results showed that the group of people that divided actions into smaller units 
were more confident about the actor’s intentions and thought the activity was short. At the 
same time the group of people who divided the activities into big units had more difficulty 
understanding what he was doing, and estimated the films to be longer. A similar study but 
with an addition of a recall-test showed that the two groups made different transcriptions of 
the same event (Hanson & Hirst, 1989). 
  People seek causal connections between events in everyday life. These connections 
are highly related to how you store event models in the long-term memory. Stronger 
connections are easier to retrieve and so better remembered, while weak connections are more 
difficult to access. The causal structure is also important in segmenting events. When one 
event fails to explain a plausible cause further mental effort is needed, which results in a new 
event model (Radvansky, 2012). Yet further exploration on this can be seen in the event 
indexing model, which suggests that events in narrative are connected in memory through 
time, space, protagonist, causality, and intentionality (Zwaan et al., 1995). According to the 
aspect of time you can see that if different events share the same time index (event models), 
they are more connected to each other in memory and therefore easier to recall. This can be 
an explanation to why it is easier to retrieve information from an event model that is active in 
the working memory, than from an event model that has been consolidated into long-term 
memory. When an event boundary has occurred it is harder to retrieve the information 
because it is no longer active in short-term memory (Zwaan, 1996). This can also be referred 
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to as the fading-foreground account (Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987; Tamplin, Krawietz, 
Radvansky, & Copeland, 2013)  
  The situation model theory (which is like the event model, though it is more 
associated with work in language) states that people continually update their situation model 
to fit with the on going narrative (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). When the protagonist moves 
from one room to another the reader will update the situation model. Objects that have been 
strongly connected to the protagonist in one room are made less available in the working 
memory if the protagonist moves to another room. Thus the farther away the objects are from 
the protagonist the harder they are to retrieve, since they are not as available in working 
memory (Glenberg et al., 1987; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). 
  The more event boundaries you experience the more the memory is impaired for 
earlier events. The explanation for this phenomenon is theorized to be that when you learn 
material in different locations you update your event models. As a result each one of the 
locations has a certain event model. When trying to remember something the different event 
models become activated in working memory and interference occurs (Radvansky, 2012).  
Likewise when information, or attributes, is stored over more than one event model, that 
particular information becomes more organized and accessible. For example if one item (or 
multiple parts of it) is represented in several events, the different event models act together to 
produce as much information as possible about that specific item, due to the organization of 
attributes. But, multiple activated event models in memory could cause interference in 
memory retrieval for only one event model. In a moment where you need to remember where 
you parked your car, several other memories of “parking your car” can become activated, 
which can confuse you and slow down the process of retrieving that one much-needed event 
model (Radvansky, 2012). 
  
 
Aim of the present study  
  The aim of the present study was to investigate how important context is for memory 
retrieval. This was done through Wickens semantic category-task. Previous studies have 
shown that by awakening cues from a context where subjects have learned material facilitates 
the memory for that material during recall. And that context shifts influence peoples’ 
interpretation of events and memory. In the present study we wanted to investigate how old 
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memories can compete with new information during recall by only reinstating the context 
from which the material was learned.  
 
1. Hypothesis 1. In line with previous studies this experiment will show a build-up of 
proactive interference in the three first triads of words. 
2. Hypothesis 2. When the fourth triad of words is presented in the same context as the 
three first triads of words there will be a proactive interference. When the fourth triad 
of words is presented in a new context there will be a release of proactive interference. 
3. Hypothesis 3. A final memory test for all the words that are presented in the 
experiment will affirm that the context were prominent, and thus the participants 
associate the context with the material they have learned.  
 
 
Method 
Subjects 
  Thirty-three subjects (23 female, 10 male) voluntarily participated in the experiment 
(M = 23,93 years, range = 20 – 29 years). The majority of the participants were students, and 
were selected through a convenience sample. All of them speak Swedish as their native 
language. Data from one subject was excluded due to age. Lemonade and cookies were 
offered, but none were given class credits or payment for participating. Informed consent was 
obtained in accordance with the ethical guidelines at the Department of Psychology, Lund 
University.   
 
 
Stimuli 
  The experiment was programmed in E-prime. Two fictional around the world trips 
were constructed (trip one and two), each containing six destinations. The trips were made 
using Illustrator, and each consisted of three freeze frames operating as the context shift (see 
figure 1). Two additional frames with the texts “Let us travel further” and “Welcome to X” 
Figure 1 Experimental procedure for one destination, consisted of one picture of the world, one with the whole world blurred, one 
with the specific destination highlighted and one with the destination and the flag of the country. 
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(where X stand for the country), made the participants understand the change from one 
destination to another. The learning frame, a blurred photography of the destination, was 
created and functioned as background when the learning material (the words) was presented.  
  There were a total of 216 words and 18 different word categories. Six categories in 
each group (A, B and C), and each category contained 12 words. The words were divided into 
four triads (T1, T2, T3 & T4). The triads were presented in sequential order (T1 first, T2 
second and so on). T1, T2 and T3 were counterbalanced so that every triad contained words 
of the same degree of difficulty according to syllables, word length and taxonomy. T4 
contained the three words with lowest taxonomy from each category to control for ceiling 
effects. The categories were taken from Swedish Category Norms (Hellerstedt, Rasmussen & 
Johansson, 2012). 
  The categories used were: bird, body part, colour, dancing style, flower, fruit, fuel, 
furniture, garment, insect, sport and tool. The countries used were: Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Great Britain, India, Japan, Mexico, The 
Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and USA.  
 
 
Design and Procedure 
  A repeated measures design was used where each participant were exposed to two 
around the world trips, randomly assigned on a 32-in. television screen. The trips were 
randomized, so that every participant visited all destinations in different order. The 
experiment began with instructions telling the participants to memorize words, contexts and 
the information presented. The procedure at the first six destinations was identical: following 
an information box about the destination (e.g., the language in Japan is Japanese), a 2-s 
presentation of one triad of words, T1 (e.g., apple pineapple papaya) was shown. A distracter 
task was presented. It consisted of a randomly picked 3-digit number, which the participant 
counted backwards from by seven for 18 s. This functioned as a rehearsal-preventing task. 
The memory test phase consisted of the question “Which were the words?” and was presented 
after the question “What number did you arrive at?”. The participant had 8 s to remember the 
words. The same procedure followed for T2 and T3: information about destination – 2-s 
presentation – distracter task – memory test phase (figure 2).  
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  Different words from the same semantic category were used in T1, T2 and T3, (e.g., 
fruits). Scoring was done by giving the participant one point for each correct answer, and one 
extra point if the words were in the same order as presented in the study phase (Wickens et 
al., 1976a). 
  After completing the first six destinations, the participant went on a short trip, 
alternating to the same destination as before (PI-condition) or to another destination (rPI-
condition). At every destination the following procedure was used: After the question “Have 
you been here before?” a triad of words, T4, were shown for 2 s, from the same sequential 
order that the categories in the six-destination trip was presented. The question was used to 
update the participants’ mental model of the context that they had learned the triads of words 
in. After a distracter task the memory test phase began after the question “What number did 
you arrive at?” and was the same as before: “Which were the words?”. The last phase 
encouraged the participants to write down all the words they remembered from the trip. Each 
destination was then shown for 30 s and was the time the participant had for remembering. 
This ended the first trip. A pause was given, and the new trip began as soon as the participant 
felt ready. The experiment lasted approximately 45 min including break.  
Figure 2 Experimental procedure at each destination. Information about the destination was followed by the words that 
were encouraged to be remembered. The distracter task lasted 18 s and the question about what number the participants 
had arrived at were followed by “which were the words”. The same procedure was repeated for T1, T2 & T3. The 
procedure at T4 were practically the same, with an additionally question about whether the participant had been at the 
specific destination before. This was shown right after the first information box. 
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Statistical Analyses 
  Statistical analysis was performed using the SPSS software (version 20 for Windows, 
SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL, USA). To detect significant differences data were analysed using 
paired-samples t-test, one-way repeated measures ANOVA and a mixed-model ANOVA. 
Results are presented as means ± standard deviation and p < .05 was considered significant. 
 
 
      Results 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the three different trials: 
T1, first triad of words, T2, second triad of words and T3, third triad of words. There was a 
significant effect for build-up of proactive interference in trial T1, T2 and T3, F (4, 64) = 
83.34, p < .001, partial eta squared = .82 (Figure 3). A paired-samples t-test was conducted to 
see if there was a release from proactive interference. The results indicated that there was a 
significant effect for release from proactive interference from T3 (M = 51.58, SD = 15.66) to 
T4, (M = 66.22, SD = 19.15), t (32), p < .001 (Figure 3). A paired-samples t-test was 
conducted to detect differences between T4-stay and T4-switch. The results showed no 
significance between words remembered if the participant stayed in the same context, T4-
stay, (M=15.67, SD = 4.88) or if the participant changed context, T4-switch, (M = 16.12, SD 
= 4.72), t (32), p = .36.  
  The participants were divided through a median split into two groups regarding 
memory performance on the final memory test for all destinations; one group with high 
memory performance (M= 63.19, SD= 13.33) and one group with low memory performance 
(M= 22.44, SD= 10.59). A mixed-model ANOVA was conducted to see if there was a 
difference between the groups in performance on T4-stay and T4-switch (T4-stay and T4-
switch was within-subject factors, and high performance group and low performance group in 
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between-subjects factor). The main effect for T4 was not significant, F (1, 30) = 0.88, p = .37. 
There was no significant interaction between high- and low performance on the final memory 
test and T4-stay and T4-switch, F (2, 30) = 0.59, p = .56. 
  The final memory test was established to affirm the effect of context as a cue to 
generate the memory for the words the participants learned in the different countries, i.e. 
inducing proactive interference. In whole, the participants remembered 25.8 % of the words 
(162 words in total). In the first trip the participants remembered 19.49 % of the words and in 
the second trip they remembered 32.14 %.  
 
 
          Discussion 
  To our best knowledge, the present study is the first that tries to examine the context’s 
Figure 3 Significant build-up of proactive interference in T1-T3. Also a 
significant release from proactive interference in trial 4, however no 
significant difference between T4-stay and T4-switch. 
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impact on memory by using the Brown-Peterson paradigm. The results for build-up of 
proactive interference in trial one, two and three were in line with the hypothesis and previous 
studies. There was a release from proactive interference in both T4-stay and T4-switch, which 
was in opposite of the hypothesis. The results for the context reinstatement and awakening 
the old memories, the differences between T4-stay and T4-switch, were not in line with the 
hypothesis. Neither were there a significant difference between high memory performers and 
low memory performers on T4-stay and T4-switch. 
  The experiment did, however, differentiate in some important aspects from the 
original experiments using the Brown-Peterson paradigm. Firstly, only three triads of words 
were used at each destination to confirm a build-up of proactive interference. Secondly, there 
was no trial to examine the release from proactive interference immediately after the third 
triad of words. Thirdly, the experiment controlled for time between the third triad of words 
(T3) and the fourth triad of words (T4) to guarantee that the context would be the only 
manipulation. Fourthly, to ensure that ceiling effects would not occur, words with lowest 
taxonomy in T4 were used. And last, and maybe the most important, there were no change in 
semantic category from the third to the fourth trial, as the manipulation was a context shift. 
  The experiment consisted of a complete new design, and yet it showed a build-up of 
proactive interference and a release from proactive interference. Where older experiments 
(see for example Wickens, 1970; Wickens, Dalezman, & Eggemeier, 1976; Underwood, 
1957; Watkins & Watkins, 1975 & Craik, 1971) have used the Brown-Peterson paradigm in 
the original way, the present experiment consisted of two around-the-world trips, where the 
participants learned words from specific semantic categories at different destinations.  
 The differences between T4-stay and T4-switch indicate that the context in the 
experiment did not work as a sufficient cue for awakening memories. Radvansky, Krawietz 
and Tamplin (2011) constructed an experiment where they let the participants pick up objects 
in one room and then move to another room and put it down. Either they picked up an object 
in one room and put it down in another, or picked up and put it down in the same room after 
visiting other rooms. The participant was to remember the objects. If the memory for objects 
were better when the participants went back to the same room as they had picked it up, then a 
the result would give support to the encoding specificity theory (Thomson, 1970), otherwise 
it would support the location updating effect (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006). The location 
updating effect states that it is the shift in locations that is the most essential for memory. The 
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results did not indicate that a return to the same context improved performance, which gives 
support to the location updating effect. It is the number of updates that impairs memory.  
 There is of course a possibility that there were too many shifts in the experiment. The 
encoding specificity holds that the material learned in one context is better remembered in 
that specific context (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The 
participants visited six different destinations. Before the T4 session they would have learned 
54 words from six different semantic categories at six different locations over a time period 
of approximately 25 minutes. There is a lot of information that would have to be consolidated 
in order to get an effective proactive interference on the last trials. The proportion of 
previously learned information could possibly have made the impact of the proactive 
interference too small. Radvansky (2012) states that when a person experience a lot of event 
boundaries memory gets impaired. The context changes can have impaired memory so that 
the participant did not manage to reinstate the context and remember the words that were 
learned there, and thus induce proactive interference. Although our final memory test 
indicated that the memory were quite good for where the words had been studied. When 
reinstating the context on the television screen participants remembered about 25 percent of 
the words. Maybe the time between the first three triads of words and the fourth triad of 
words were too long, instead of the number of context changes. When the participants were to 
awaken the words previously studied in one context the words were forgotten due to too long 
time since the study phase. One way to test this hypothesis would be to shorten the trips to 
three-four destinations, and thereby making the memory traces more accessible in long-term 
memory.  
  Unlike previous studies within the Brown-Peterson paradigm, the present study did 
not investigate proactive interference per se, but used the phenomenon to look at memory and 
context. Wickens and his colleagues used a semantic shift in word category between the 
third- and the fourth trial to investigate how old knowledge can impair memory performance 
(Wickens et al., 1976a), while this study only made a contextual shift at T4. And even though 
our context reinstatement was an exact overlap (the same picture of the destination were 
shown when the participant revisited the destination), maybe our context could have been 
more prominent. Our television screen may have been too small to create an immersion that 
was necessary for the participants to experience it. We did not make any further 
investigations to how screen size affects the experience of the context. However Radvansky 
and his colleagues (2011) tested the influence of screen size on perception of events and 
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event boundaries in their second inquiry of “walk-through doorways”-experiment. By 
repeating the experiment in three different ways, with a bigger screen, a smaller screen and in 
a real-life environment, they saw no significant difference in the effect of the context shift. 
This suggests that the screen size did not make that much of a difference to the results 
(Radvansky, Krawietz, & Tamplin, 2011). 
  When participants travel between destinations they will create an event model for 
each location, and when features in an event model changes physically or conceptually, a new 
one emerges. The experiment was constructed so that the physical changes (travelling 
between locations) generated event models, rather than conceptual (Kurby & Zacks, 2008). 
The specific event model contains information about what they have learned at that location. 
When the participant returns that particular event model will re-emerge and thus interfere 
with present learning. There could however be a problem as for the background-pictures in 
the experiment. Environmental similarities could bring forth several event models at the same 
time, which in turn can lead to a loss of competing memories (Radvansky, 2012). Possibly the 
conceptual features could have a stronger impact on the phenomenon proactive interference 
then contextual changes. 
  After the trials in the first and second trip the participants were asked to write down 
the words they remembered in a last memory test. As the participants revisited the 
destinations they were asked to remember both memorized words and in what semantic 
category the words were placed. The results showed that the performance was extensively 
better at the second final memory test. This could be due to a practice effect, a recollection of 
the initial instructions after the first final memory test or an alteration in memorization 
strategy after the first final memory test. To investigate if the improved memory in the second 
trip made an impact on differences between T4-stay and T4-switch we performed a mixed-
model ANOVA. No significant differences were found. This can, of course, be due to several 
different confounds: no context reinstatement, ambiguous instructions, memory overload etc. 
This can affect the internal validity of the experiment. Logically persons with better memory 
would have a stronger proactive interference in the T4 as more memories (memories that to a 
greater extent are consolidated) compete during memorization and memory retrieval. 
Simultaneously participants with lower memory function would perform of inferior quantity. 
  The interjudge reliability was high, even though there were two different experiment 
leaders. The words were verbally told by the participants and the experiment leaders had 
direct guidelines for how to collect answers. There was an ambiguity in the final memory test, 
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which affected the reliability of that test. The extent to which the results can be generalized to 
a larger population is limited due to the use of a convenience sample. 
  In summary, the present study examined how old memories can compete with new 
information during recall only by reinstating the context from which the material was learned. 
The results showed no significant effect for that context reinstatement induced proactive 
interference. It could be interesting for future research to extend the context reinstatement by 
including more than just the visual stimuli (e.g. sounds, virtual reality etc.), and they will also 
have to increase the sensitivity in the experiment procedure.   
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Informerat samtycke 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION TILL FORSKNINGSPERSON 
 
Tillfrågande om deltagande 
Du tillfrågas härmed om Du vill deltaga i denna studie som inkluderar datoriserade beteendetest. 
 
Bakgrund och syfte 
Det generella syftet med undersökningen är att öka förståelsen för grundläggande minnesfunktioner. 
Avsikten är att kartlägga hur vi lagrar och plockar fram information ur minnet, att förklara varför vi 
ibland glömmer information, samt att belysa samspelet mellan olika minnessystem och hjärnregioner.  
 
Studiens genomförande och risker 
Experimentet består av två huvuddelar. I en del kommer ett antal stimuli (t ex ord, bilder) att 
presenteras och Din uppgift är att försöka lägga dessa på minnet och i en andra del kommer Din 
minnesprestation för det inlärda materialet att mätas.  
 
Experimentet är helt datoriserat, vilket innebär att Du kommer att presenteras för olika typer av 
stimuli på en datorskärm och att alla Dina bedömningar samlas in för lagring via knapptryckningar.   
 
Undersökningstiden är c:a 45 minuter. 
 
Hantering av data 
Persondata från studien kommer att lagras i ett register och databehandlas. Dina uppgifter är 
sekretesskyddade och ingen obehörig har tillgång till registret. Då data från studien publiceras 
kommer enskilda individer inte att kunna identifieras. Hanteringen av Dina uppgifter regleras av 
Personuppgiftslagen (SFS1998:204). Se bifogad bilaga med allmän information om behandling av 
personuppgifter i forskningssyfte vid Lunds universitet. 
 
 
Sekretess 
Vi behandlar resultaten av studien konfidentiellt. 
 
 
 
Depar tment  o f  Psycho logy  
Mikae l  Johansson , PhD 
Pro jektansva r ig  
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Frivillighet 
Du deltar helt frivilligt och kan när som helst avbryta Din medverkan i studien utan att behöva ange 
någon anledning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ytterligare information 
Förutom denna skriftliga information kommer Du att bli muntligen informerad före undersökningen. 
Då får Du också möjlighet att ställa frågor. Du är också välkommen att ringa någon av följande 
personer för att få ytterligare information. 
 
Mikael Johansson, projektansvarig Förnamn Efternamn, experimentledare 
Professor Kandidat 
Neuropsykologiska avdelningen Tel:  
Institutionen för psykologi  
Tel: 046 – 222 36 39  
 
 
Jag har muntligen informerats om studien och tagit del av den skriftliga informationen. Jag är 
medveten om att mitt deltagande i studien är fullt frivilligt och att jag när som helst och utan närmare 
förklaring kan avbryta mitt deltagande. 
 
 
_____________________ _____________________ 
Datum Datum 
 
_____________________ _____________________ 
Deltagarens signatur Experimentledarens signatur 
 
_____________________ _____________________ 
Deltagarens namnförtydligande Experimentledarens namnförtydligande 
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